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THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN

A Review of Decisions Rendered
by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Criminal Matters:
January 1 to November 30, 2017
Wayne K. Gorman

T

his column will review those decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court of Canada, between January 1 and
November 30, 2017, that involved criminal causes or
matters. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a
multitude of issues involving criminal law, including defences,
evidence, and sentencing. The Court also considered the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982, to various criminal-law provisions and
procedures.
Let us start with the Supreme Court’s consideration in 2017
of criminal offences.

(1) OFFENCES:

(A) BREATHALYZER DEMANDS:
Section 253 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to
operate a motor vehicle in Canada with a blood-alcohol level
that exceeds 80 milligrams of alcohol per every 100 milliliters
of blood. The Criminal Code allows the Crown to establish a
person’s blood-alcohol level through the introduction of a certificate prepared by a police officer who conducted a breathalyzer test upon the accused. Section 258 of the Criminal Code
creates a presumption that the certificate is accurate if the samples were taken within a prescribed time period.
In R. v. Alex, 2017 SCC 37, a vehicle being operated by the
accused was stopped by the police. The accused provided samples of his breath that registered blood-alcohol levels above the
legal limit. He was charged with driving “over 80,” contrary to
section 253 of the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court noted
that, to rely upon the section 258 presumptions, the Crown
must prove that the breath samples were “taken within a prescribed period of time following the alleged offence; the samples have to be provided directly into an approved container or
instrument; and the instrument has to be operated by a properly qualified technician” (at paragraph 4).
At his trial, the trial judge found that the police officer did

Footnotes
1. Sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter state as follows:
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure.
24(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court con-

140 Court Review - Volume 53

not have lawful grounds to have made the breathalyzer
demand, but concluded that it was not necessary for the
Crown to prove that a lawful demand had been made to rely on
the evidentiary presumption contained within section 258 of
the Criminal Code.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the following
issue was raised (at paragraph 5): “The issue in this appeal is
whether, in addition to the three preconditions just mentioned,
the Crown must also establish that the demand for the breath
sample made by the police was a ‘lawful’ demand before it can
take advantage of the evidentiary shortcuts.”
The Supreme Court concluded, at paragraph 11, that the
Crown did not have to
prove that the demand was lawful in order to take advantage of the shortcuts. If the taking of the samples is subjected to Charter scrutiny, and the evidence of the breath
test results is found to be inadmissible by virtue of ss. 8
and 24(2) of the Charter, that will end the matter. Resort
to the evidentiary shortcuts will be a non-issue. On the
other hand, if the taking of the samples is subjected to s.
8 Charter scrutiny, and the breath test results are found
to be admissible in evidence — either because no s. 8
breach occurred or because the evidence survived s.
24(2) Charter scrutiny — the shortcuts should remain
available to the Crown.1
(2) DEFENCES:

(A) MISTAKE OF AGE:
Section 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code allows an accused
person charged with certain sexual offences, involving children less than sixteen years of age, to raise the defence of mistake of age. The section requires the accused to have taken all
reasonable steps to have ascertained the age of the complainant
before the defence can be applicable.

cludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all
the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

In R. v. George, 2017 SCC 38, the accused was charged with
the offence of sexual interference. The trial judge acquitted the
accused based on having a reasonable doubt about whether the
Crown had proven that the accused had failed to take all reasonable steps to determine the complainant’s age. A majority of
the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, quashed the acquittals,
and ordered a new trial. The accused appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada. The appeal was allowed and the acquittals
restored.
The Supreme Court noted, at paragraph 8, that to
convict an accused person who demonstrates an “air of
reality” to the mistake of age defence, the Crown must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that the
accused person (1) did not honestly believe the complainant was at least 16 (the subjective element); or (2)
did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age (the objective element).
The Supreme Court concluded that, in this case, a “review
of the trial judge’s reasons reveals no legal errors. As a result,
the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the
trial judgment” (at paragraph 15).
(B) OFFICIALLY INDUCED ERROR
In R. v. Bédard, 2017 SCC 4, the Supreme Court considered
the defence of officially induced error, though in a brief oral
judgment. The Court summarized the elements of the offence
in the following manner (at paragraph one):
The defence of officially induced error of law is intended
to protect a diligent person who first questions a government authority about the interpretation of legislation
so as to be sure to comply with it and then is prosecuted
by the same government for acting in accordance with
the interpretation the authority gave him or her.
(3) EVIDENCE:

(A) INFORMER PRIVILEGE
In R. v. Durham Regional Crime Stoppers Inc., 2017 SCC 45,
the police received a Crime Stoppers tip concerning a fatal
shooting. A few days later Keenan Corner was charged with
the offence of second-degree murder.
The Supreme Court of Canada noted, at paragraph 6, that at
the trial
[t]he Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking to
introduce evidence of the anonymous tip made to
Crime Stoppers. Prior to any rulings being made by the
application judge, the Crown disclosed to the defence
the anonymous tip and all relevant information about it
in its possession. The Crown maintained that the call
was made by Keenan Corner to divert attention away
from himself in the police investigation. It sought to
use the call at trial as evidence relevant to Keenan Corner’s general credibility . . . Keenan Corner denied making the call. In addition, he and Crime Stoppers submitted that the call was covered by informer privilege.

In response, the Crown
asserted that informer privilege did not apply to the
tip.
The application judge (at
paragraph 7):

“[S]hielding this
person’s identity
behind the
near absolute
protection of
informer
privilege would
compromise,
if not negate,
the privilege’s
objectives.”

found that Keenan Corner
had made the call and that
he had done so with the
intention of diverting attention away from himself in
the police investigation.
[The trial judge held] that
informer privilege did not
apply to the tip because its application would, in the circumstances, undermine the objectives which underlie
the privilege.

An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 2, that the primary
issue raised by this appeal was
whether informer privilege exists where a caller makes
an anonymous tip to Crime Stoppers with the intention
of interfering with the administration of justice. A secondary issue concerns the procedure to be followed
when the Crown challenges a claim of informer privilege
over an anonymous tip made to Crime Stoppers.
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that
informer privilege “does not exist where a person has contacted Crime Stoppers with the intention of furthering criminal activity or interfering with the administration of justice”
(at paragraphs 9 and 10):
As regards the primary issue, the application judge
excluded the tip from the scope of informer privilege on
the basis that Keenan Corner made the call to Crime
Stoppers in order to divert attention away from himself
in a police investigation. In my view, he did not err in
doing so. Informer privilege does not exist where a person has contacted Crime Stoppers with the intention of
furthering criminal activity or interfering with the
administration of justice. In such circumstances, shielding this person’s identity behind the near absolute protection of informer privilege would compromise, if not
negate, the privilege’s objectives.
With respect to the secondary issue, I am satisfied that
the procedure followed by the application judge was
reasonable. That said, this case provides the Court with
an opportunity to clarify the procedure that should be
followed and the safeguards that can be put in place
when the Crown challenges the applicability of
informer privilege over an anonymous tip made to
Crime Stoppers.
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What Is the Procedure to Be
Followed by a Court When
the Crown Challenges a Claim
of Privilege Over an Anonymous Tip?
The Supreme Court held
that when the Crown challenges a claim of privilege over
an anonymous tip, “the court
must consider whether privilege in fact exists at an in camera hearing” (at paragraph 35).
The Court also held, at paragraph 36, that the “in camera
hearing will likely require an ex
parte proceeding—in which the
accused and defence counsel
are excluded—to determine
whether informer privilege
applies to the tip.” Finally, the Court concluded that “the
application judge may review the record of the anonymous
tip” (at paragraphs 38-39).

The Court
held that
“[o]nly serious
misconduct can
justify such a
sanction against
a lawyer. . . .
[C]ourts must
be cautious . . .
in light of the
duties owed by
lawyers to their
clients . . . .”

(4) TRIALS:

(A) THE ORDERING OF COSTS AGAINST COUNSEL:
In Quebec (Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions) v.
Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26, an application judge awarded costs personally against defence counsel after dismissing counsel’s
applications for recusal of two trial judges on the basis of purported apprehensions of bias. On appeal, the Quebec Court of
Appeal set aside the award of costs against counsel. The
Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada restored the order of costs
made against defence counsel. The Court indicated that “[t]he
courts have the power to maintain respect for their authority.
This includes the power to manage and control the proceedings conducted before them . . . A court therefore has an inherent power to control abuse in this regard . . . .” (at paragraph
16). The Supreme Court also held that “[t]his power of the
courts to award costs against a lawyer personally is not limited
to civil proceedings, but can also be exercised in criminal cases
. . . . This means that it may sometimes be exercised against
defence lawyers in criminal proceedings, although such situations are rare . . . .” (at paragraph 19).
THE CRITERIA:
The Supreme Court indicated that “the threshold for exercising” the power to award costs against defence counsel personally “is a high one” (at paragraph 25). The Court held that
“[o]nly serious misconduct can justify such a sanction against
a lawyer. Moreover, the courts must be cautious in imposing it
in light of the duties owed by lawyers to their clients . . . .” (at
paragraph 25). The Supreme Court held that an award of costs
personally against counsel can only be ordered in “exceptional” circumstances (at paragraph 29).
THE PROCEDURE:
The Supreme Court indicated, at paragraph 36, that when a
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court is considering issuing an order of costs personally
against counsel, the lawyer involved
should be given prior notice of the allegations against
him or her and the possible consequences. The notice
should contain sufficient information about the alleged
facts and the nature of the evidence in support of those
facts. The notice should be sent far enough in advance to
enable the lawyer to prepare adequately. The lawyer
should, of course, have an opportunity to make separate
submissions on costs and to adduce any relevant evidence in this regard. Ideally, the issue of awarding costs
against the lawyer personally should be argued only after
the proceeding has been resolved on its merits.
The Court also indicated that the Crown “must confine itself
to its role as prosecutor of the accused. It must not also become
the prosecutor of the defence lawyer” (at paragraph 38).
APPLICATION TO THIS CASE:
In applying these principles to this case, the Supreme Court
described the conduct of counsel in this case as being “particularly reprehensible” (at paragraph 42). It indicated, at paragraph 42, that the purpose of the applications were
unrelated to the motions he brought. The respondent
was motivated by a desire to have the hearing postponed
rather than by a sincere belief that the judges targeted by
his motions were hostile. . . . The respondent thus used
the extraordinary remedies for a purely dilatory purpose
with the sole objective of obstructing the orderly conduct of the judicial process in a calculated manner. It
was therefore reasonable for the judge to conclude that
the respondent had acted in bad faith and in a way that
amounted to abuse of process, thereby seriously interfering with the administration of justice.
(B) TRIALS: DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SCRUTINY OF THE
EVIDENCE:
In R. v. Awer, 2017 SCC 2, the accused was convicted of the
offence of sexual assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada the accused argued that the trial judge subjected a
defence expert to a higher level of scrutiny than the Crown’s
expert.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. In a brief judgment, the Court
concluded that (at paragraphs 5-6):
[T]he materially different levels of scrutiny to which the
evidence of the two experts was subjected—none for the
Crown expert and intense for the defence expert—was
unwarranted, and it tended to shift the burden of proof
onto the appellant. . . . In these circumstances, we feel
obliged to quash the conviction and order a new trial.
(C) TRIALS: JOINDER OF PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL
OFFENCES:
In R. v. Sciascia, 2017 SCC 57, the accused was charged with
offences contrary to a provincial Highway Traffic Act and the

Criminal Code on separate informations (the Criminal Code
offence was proceeded with by way of summary conviction).
With the accused’s consent the two informations were tried
together in a single trial. The accused was convicted of a
provincial offence and a Criminal Code offence. He appealed
arguing that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to conduct a
joint trial on the criminal and provincial charges and that his
trial was therefore a nullity.
The appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada
held that a Provincial Court judge has jurisdiction to conduct
a joint trial of a provincial charges and summary conviction
Criminal Code offence. The Supreme Court indicated that
“conducting a joint trial is both permissible and desirable
where the provincial charges and the summary conviction
criminal charges share a sufficient factual nexus and it is in the
interests of justice to try them together” (at paragraph one).
(D) JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE PENDING APPEAL:
In R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, the accused was convicted of
second-degree murder. Section 679 of the Criminal Code
allows for a convicted person to seek judicial interim release by
a single judge of the province’s Court of Appeal. An unsuccessful application can be reviewed by a panel of the Court of
Appeal.
In this case, a Judge of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
denied the accused’s application for release. A review by a
panel of three judges of the Court of Appeal upheld the denial
of bail. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court held that
the accused should have been released by the Court of Appeal
Judge and that the panel of the Court of Appeal erred in affirming the denial of bail. In the course of the ruling, the Supreme
Court considered sections 515(10)(c) [the public confidence
test for release consideration by trial judges]; 679(3)(c) [the
public confidence test for release by a single Judge of the Court
of Appeal pending an appeal]; and 680(1) [review of a section
679 decision by a panel of three judges of the Court of Appeal]
of the Criminal Code.
SECTION 679(3)(C):
The Supreme Court noted that in section 679(3)(c) of the
Criminal Code, “Parliament has not provided appellate judges
with any direction as to how a release pending appeal order is
likely to affect public confidence in the administration of justice” (at paragraph 31). However, “it has done so” under section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code (at paragraph 31). The
Court held that the four factors listed in section 515(10)(c),
“with appropriate modifications to reflect the post-conviction
context—should be accounted for in considering how, if at all,
a release pending appeal order is likely to affect public confidence in the administration of justice” (at paragraph 32).
The Supreme Court pointed out that in assessing public
confidence concerns pursuant to section 515(10)(c), “the seriousness of the crime plays an important role. The more serious
the crime, the greater the risk that public-confidence in the
administration of justice will be undermined if the accused is
released on bail pending trial” (at paragraph 37). The Supreme
Court concluded that in considering the public confidence
component under section 679(3)(c), “the seriousness of the

crime for which a person has been
convicted should . . . play an equal
role in assessing the enforceability
interest” (at paragraph 37).
SECTION 680(1):
The Supreme Court held that a
panel reviewing a decision of a
single judge under s. 680(1)
should be guided by the following
three principles (at paragraph 61):

“[A]dmitting a
statement by an
accused for the
purpose of
assessing the
constitutionality
of state action
. . . does not
engage the
rationale for the
confessions
rule.”

First, absent palpable and overriding error, the review panel
must show deference to the
judge’s findings of fact. Second,
the review panel may intervene
and substitute its decision for that of the judge where it
is satisfied that the judge erred in law or in principle, and
the error was material to the outcome. Third, in the
absence of legal error, the review panel may intervene
and substitute its decision for that of the judge where it
concludes that the decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Supreme Court, at paragraph 69, concluded that that
the appeal court judge
did not apply the correct test in assessing the strength of
Mr. Oland’s appeal and the implications flowing from it.
Much as he was satisfied that Mr. Oland had raised
“clearly arguable” grounds of appeal, this was not
enough. . . . [H]is reasons show[] he required more,
something in the nature of unique circumstances that
would have virtually assured a new trial or an acquittal[.]
(5) EVIDENCE:

(A) THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COMMON-LAW CONFESSIONS RULE TO STATEMENTS TENDERED IN A
VOIR DIRE UNDER THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS:
In R. v. Paterson, 2017 SCC 15, the Crown sought to establish the reasonableness of a warrantless search by presenting
evidence on a Charter voir dire of things said to the police by
the accused before they entered his residence. An appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada raised the following issue: “the
applicability of the common law confessions rule to statements
tendered in a voir dire under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms” (at paragraph 1).
The accused argued that the Crown was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that any statements made by the
accused and upon which it relied to support the police entry
into the apartment, were voluntarily made (i.e., the “confessions rule”). The Supreme Court rejected this proposition. It
held, at paragraph 18, that “the confessions rule should not be
expanded as proposed by the appellant. More particularly . . .
the confessions rule should not apply to statements tendered
in the context of a voir dire under the Charter.” The Supreme
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It held that a
drug-recognition
expert’s
expertise had
been conclusively
and irrebuttably
established by
Parliament . . . .

Court held that (at paragraph
21):

[A]dmitting a statement by an
accused for the purpose of
assessing the constitutionality
of state action, as opposed to
the purpose of determining
the accused’s guilt, does not
engage the rationale for the
confessions rule. To apply the
rule to evidence presented at a
Charter voir dire would distort both the rule and its rationale.

(B) HEARSAY:
In R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, a witness (Thielen) provided a videotaped reenactment of two murders in which he
implicated the accused. Thielen refused to testify at the
accused’s trial. The Crown sought to admit into evidence his
reenactment. The trial judge admitted the reenactment and the
accused was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, the following issue was raised (at paragraph 18):
“When can a trial judge rely on corroborative evidence to conclude that the threshold reliability of a hearsay statement is
established?”
The Supreme Court held that (at paragraph 4):
[C]orroborative evidence may be used to assess threshold reliability if it overcomes the specific hearsay dangers
presented by the statement. These dangers may be overcome on the basis of corroborative evidence if it shows,
when considered as a whole and in the circumstances of
the case, that the only likely explanation for the hearsay
statement is the declarant’s truthfulness about, or the
accuracy of, the material aspects of the statement. The
material aspects are those relied on by the moving party
for the truth of their contents.
However, the Court noted that (at paragraph 6):
[T]he evidence he relied on did not, when considered in
the circumstances of the case, show that the only likely
explanation was that Thielen was truthful about Bradshaw’s involvement in the murders. It did not substantially negate the possibility that Thielen lied about Bradshaw’s participation in the murders. While this corroborative evidence may increase the probative value of the
re-enactment statement if admitted, it is of no assistance
in assessing the statement’s threshold reliability. The trial
judge therefore erred in relying on this corroborative evidence.
(C) DRUG RECOGNITION EXPERT EVIDENCE:
Section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code allows designated
police officers (referred to as “drug recognition experts”) to
demand that the operator of a motor vehicle submit to a drug
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evaluation (a series of physical tests designed to determine if
the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle is impaired by a
drug).
In R. v. Bingley, 2017 SCC 12, the accused was involved in
a motor vehicle collision. A police officer, who was designated
as a drug recognition expert, conducted a “field sobriety test”
which led to the accused being charged with the offence of
operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the following
issue was raised (at paragraph 1): “Can a drug recognition
expert (‘DRE’) testify about his or her determination under s.
254(3.1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, without a
voir dire to determine the DRE’s expertise?”
The Supreme Court held that a voir dire was not required.
The Court indicated that while a trial judge would normally
determine whether an expert has special expertise at a voir dire,
section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code conclusively answered
the question. It held that a drug recognition expert’s expertise
had been conclusively and irrebuttably established by Parliament (at paragraph 20):
The DRE, literally, is a “drug recognition expert”, certified as such for the purposes of the scheme. It is undisputed that the DRE receives special training in how to
administer the 12-step drug recognition evaluation and
in what inferences may be drawn from the factual data he
or she notes. It is for this limited purpose that a DRE can
assist the court by offering expert opinion evidence.
(6) CHARTER:

(A) SECTION 8: SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES:
In Paterson, the police entered an apartment to seize several
marihuana roaches. The police told the accused they would
treat this as a “no case” seizure, meaning that they intended to
seize the roaches without charging him. Once inside, the
police observed a bulletproof vest, a firearm, and drugs. They
arrested the accused, obtained a warrant to search his apartment, and executed the warrant. This led to the discovery of
other firearms and drugs.
The accused was charged with various drug and firearm
offences. He was convicted at trial. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal of British Columbia upheld the convictions.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Supreme Court described one of the issues raised by the appeal
as being (at paragraph 1): “[W]hether, on the facts of this case,
exigent circumstances, within the meaning of s. 11(7) of the
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19
(“CDSA”), made it impracticable to obtain a warrant before
entering and searching the appellant’s residence[.]”
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals. The Supreme Court of Canada
held that the police entry into the appellant’s residence “was
not justified by exigent circumstances making it impracticable
to obtain a warrant” (at paragraph 4). The Court excluded the
evidence located by the search, pursuant to section 24(2) of
the Charter and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court held that (at paragraphs 33-34):
“[E]xigent circumstances” in s. 11(7) denotes not merely
convenience, propitiousness or economy, but rather
urgency, arising from circumstances calling for immediate police action to preserve evidence, officer safety or
public safety. . . . Even where exigent circumstances are
present, however, they are not, on their own, sufficient to
justify a warrantless search of a residence under s. 11(7).
Those circumstances must render it “impracticable” to
obtain a warrant.
The Court held, at paragraph 34, that the “impracticability
of obtaining a warrant does not support a finding of exigent
circumstances.”
The Court also held, at paragraphs 36-37, that the word
“impracticable” within the meaning of s. 11(7) contemplates that the exigent nature of the circumstances are
such that taking time to obtain a warrant would seriously
undermine the objective of police action—whether it be
preserving evidence, officer safety or public safety. . . . In
sum, I conclude that, in order for a warrantless entry to
satisfy s. 11(7), the Crown must show that the entry was
compelled by urgency, calling for immediate police
action to preserve evidence, officer safety or public safety.
Further, this urgency must be shown to have been such
that taking the time to obtain a warrant would pose serious risk to those imperatives.
In the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that (at paragraph 39):
[T]he police had a practicable option: to arrest the appellant and obtain a warrant to enter the residence and seize
the roaches. If, as the Crown says, the situation was not
serious enough to arrest and apply for a warrant, then it
cannot have been serious enough to intrude into a private residence without a warrant.
The Supreme Court concluded, at paragraph 41, that “the
warrantless entry by the police into the appellant’s residence
was not authorized by s. 11(7) of the CDSA, and infringed his
right under s. 8 of the Charter to be secure against unreasonable search.”
(B) EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER SECTION 24(2):
Section 24(2) of the Charter allows a Canadian trial judge
to exclude evidence that “was obtained in a manner that
infringed” any of the provisions of the Charter if the admission
of the evidence “would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.”
In Paterson, the Supreme Court held that the evidence
obtained by the police was obtained in violation of section 8 of
the Charter should be excluded despite the seriousness of the
offences (at paragraphs 56-57):
It is therefore important not to allow the third Grant
2009 factor of society’s interest in adjudicating a case on

its merits to trump all other
“If . . . the
considerations, particularly
where (as here) the impugned situation was not
conduct was serious and
serious enough
worked a substantial impact
to arrest and
on the appellant’s Charter
apply for a
right. In this case, I find that
the importance of ensuring
warrant, then it
that such conduct is not concannot have
doned by the court favours
been serious
exclusion. As Doherty J.A.
enough to
also said in McGuffie, at para.
83, “[t]he court can only adeintrude into a
quately disassociate the jusprivate residence
tice system from the police
without a
misconduct and reinforce the
community’s commitment to
warrant.”
individual rights protected by
the Charter by excluding the evidence. . . . This unpalatable result is the direct product of the manner in which
the police chose to conduct themselves.”
Having considered these factors separately and together,
I am of the view that the evidence obtained as a result of
the entry and search of the appellant’s residence should
be excluded, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
(C) SECTION 11(B): TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME:
Section 11(b) of the Charter protects the right of an accused
person to be tried within a reasonable period of time. It states
as follows:
Any person charged with an offence has the right
....
(b) to be tried within a reasonable time[.]
In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, the Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in relation to section 11(b) of the Charter.
In that decision the Court created presumptive time frames (18
months for summary conviction offences and 30 months for
indictable offences), the breach of which will result in the staying of charges for unreasonable delay. In R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC
31, the Court had the opportunity to revisit Jordan, particularly
in relation to cases in which the charges had been laid prior to
Jordan being issued (referred to as “transitional cases”).
The Supreme Court held in Cody that the “new framework
in Jordan applies to cases already in the system. . . . However,
in some cases, the transitional exceptional circumstance may
justify a presumptively unreasonable delay where the charges
were brought prior to the release of Jordan” (at paragraph 67).
The Court indicated that (at paragraph 68):
[T]he transitional exceptional circumstance assessment involves a qualitative exercise. . . . The Crown may
rely on the transitional exceptional circumstance if it can
show that “the time the case has taken is justified based
on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed” . . . Put another way, the Crown may show
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that it cannot be faulted for
failing to take further steps,
because it would have
understood the delay to be
reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan and the
way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness
of the offence and prejudice
would have been assessed
under Morin.
The Supreme Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was appropriate because the
Crown was unable to establish that the delay “was justified
based on its reliance on the previous state of the law” (at paragraphs 73-74):

or both. The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the phrase
“imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment”
found in section 11(f) of the Charter primarily engaged the
deprivation of liberty inherent in the maximum sentence of
imprisonment imposed by the statute. The Court of Appeal
concluded that a maximum penalty of “five years less a day”
did not become a more severe penalty just because some collateral negative consequences were added to it.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court in R.
v. Peers, 2017 SCC 13, stated in a brief oral judgment (at paragraph 1): “The appeal is dismissed. We conclude that the
appellant was not entitled to a trial by jury, substantially for the
reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, 2015 ABCA
407, 609 A.R. 352.”

The charges in this case were serious. In our view, however, this consideration is overcome by the trial judge’s
findings of “real and substantial actual prejudice” . . .
The trial judge also made an express finding that Mr.
Cody’s conduct was not “inconsistent with the desire for
a timely trial” . . . .

(A) CONDITIONAL SENTENCES:
Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code allows a judge to order
that a period of imprisonment of less than two years be served
in the community under certain conditions (normally including “house arrest”). These sentences are referred to as “conditional sentences.”
In Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
the nature of conditional sentences in the following context (at
paragraph 2):

“In light of these
findings, the
Crown cannot
show that the
36.5 months of
net delay in this
case was
justified . . . .”

In light of these findings, the Crown cannot show that
the 36.5 months of net delay in this case was justified
based on its reliance on the previous state of the law. To
the contrary, the trial judge’s findings under the previous
law strengthen the case for a stay of proceedings. Where
a balancing of the factors under the Morin analysis, such
as seriousness of the offence and prejudice, would have
weighed in favour of a stay, we expect that the Crown
will rarely, if ever, be successful in justifying the delay as
a transitional exceptional circumstance under the Jordan
framework. We therefore find that the delay in this case
was unreasonable.2
(D) SECTION 11(F): THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
Section 11(f) of the Charter guarantees the right to trial by
jury. It states as follows:
Any person charged with an offence has the right
....
(f) except in the case of an offence under military
law tried before a military tribunal, to the benefit of
trial by jury where the maximum punishment for
the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more
severe punishment[.]
In R. v. Peers, 2015 ABCA 407 (Can. Alta.), the accused was
charged with an offence, contrary to section 194 of the Securities Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. S-4 (Can. Alta.). The maximum
penalty for a conviction under this provision was a period of
imprisonment of five years less a day, a fine of up to $5 million,

2. For a review of Cody, see Matthew R. Gourlay, After Jordan: The
Fate of the Speedy Trial and Prospects for Systemic Reform, 36:2
ADVOC. J. 22-27 (2017).
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(7) SENTENCING:

This appeal concerns the obligation of permanent residents to avoid “serious criminality”, as set out in s.
36(1)(a) of the IRPA [Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.]. This obligation is breached when
a permanent resident is convicted of a federal offence
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at
least 10 years, or of a federal offence for which a term of
imprisonment of more than 6 months has been imposed.
The Supreme Court made the following comments concerning the nature and purpose of conditional sentences (at
paragraphs 28, 32, 33):
[C]onditional sentences generally indicate less “serious
criminality” than jail terms. As Lamer C.J. said, a “conditional sentence is a meaningful alternative to incarceration for less serious and non-dangerous offenders” . . .
Thus, more serious crimes may be punished by jail sentences that are shorter than conditional sentences
imposed for less serious crimes—shorter because they
are served in jail rather than in the community. . . . Conditional sentences are designed as an alternative to incarceration in order to encourage rehabilitation, reduce the
rate of incarceration, and improve the effectiveness of
sentencing . . . .

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
a number of issues in 2017 related to criminal law and procedure. This included the defences of mistake of age (R. v.
George) and officially induced error (R. v. Bédard). In addition,
the Supreme Court commented upon conditional sentences
(Tran v. Canada), clarified the law of bail at the appellate level
(R. v. Oland), and considered the nature and extent of informer
privilege (R. v. Durham Regional Crime Stoppers Inc.). In the
constitutional context, the Court considered exigent circumstances in the law of search and seizure and when evidence
obtained in violation of the Charter should be excluded (R. v.
Paterson).
Finally, it is difficult to predict over the course of a year
which decision rendered by the Supreme Court will have the
most significant long-term effect. For the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2017, I would choose the Court’s decision in Cody.
In Cody the Court affirmed its groundbreaking and controver-

sial decision in Jordan. Cody provided the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to step back from Jordan or to affirm its
remarkable transformation of the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time in Canada. It chose the latter.
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